Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt by Sobol, Neil L
University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender
and Class
Volume 15 | Issue 2 Article 6
Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive
Collection of Criminal Justice Debt
Neil L. Sobol
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in University of Maryland Law Journal of Race, Religion, Gender and Class by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey
Law. For more information, please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Neil L. Sobol, Lessons Learned from Ferguson: Ending Abusive Collection of Criminal Justice Debt, 15 U. Md. L.J. Race Relig. Gender &
Class 293 ().
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/rrgc/vol15/iss2/6
Sobol    
 
 
 
 
 
LESSONS LEARNED FROM FERGUSON: 
ENDING ABUSIVE COLLECTION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
DEBT 
 
Neil L. Sobol

 
 
“Addressing the deeply embedded constitutional 
deficiencies we found demands an entire reorientation 
of law enforcement in Ferguson.  The City must replace 
revenue-driven policing with a system grounded in the 
principles of community policing and police 
legitimacy, in which people are equally protected and 
treated with compassion, regardless of race.”1 
 
 On March 4, 2015, Attorney General Eric Holder announced 
the release of the Department of Justice’s “searing report” on the 
Ferguson Police Department.
2
  The report was the product of one of 
two federal investigations that occurred in response to a police 
officer’s fatal shooting of Michael Brown, an unarmed black teenager, 
in August 2014.
3
  While the investigation of the officer concludes that 
                                                 
© 2015 Neil L. Sobol. 

 Associate Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law; J.D. (cum 
laude, order of the coif), Southern Methodist University; M.S. and B.A. (with 
distinction), Stanford University. I appreciate the encouragement and assistance of 
my colleagues at Texas A&M. This symposium article was a prepared for a 
discussion group organized by Professors Cynthia Alkon and Catherine Hancock 
held on July 29, 2015, at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools conference. I 
am grateful for the feedback received at the conference, including a review of my 
draft by Professor Renee Hutchins. I am also thankful for the reseach assistance of 
Macy D. Jones-Smith. Finally, I want to thank my wife, Becky, for her support and 
understanding. 
1
 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON 
POLICE DEPARTMENT 6 (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/ferguson_findings_3-4-15.pdf 
[hereinafter FPD REP.]. 
2
 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General  Holder Delivers Update on Investigation 
in Ferguson, Missouri,  JUSTICE.GOV (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-holder-delivers-update-
investigations-ferguson-missouri [hereinafter Holder Press Release]. 
3
 Matt Apuzzo & John Eligon, Ferguson Police Tainted by Bias, Justice Department 
Says, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/05/us/us-calls-
on-ferguson-to-overhaul-criminal-justice-system.html; U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT REGARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO 
THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MICHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE 
OFFICER DARREN WILSON (2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf 
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the “evidence does not support charging a violation of federal law,”4 
the review of the police department paints a disturbing picture of  
public officials more concerned with collecting revenue than 
protecting public safety.
5
 
 
 Unfortunately, these allegations are neither limited to 
Ferguson, a town of 21,000 people, nor are they recent developments 
in the United States.
6
  As Eric Holder explained, “although the 
concerns we are focused on . . . may be particularly acute in 
Ferguson—they are not confined to any one city, state, or geographic 
region. They implicate questions about fairness and trust that are 
national in scope.”7 Change is necessary in Ferguson and other cities 
to combat the abusive collection of the criminal justice debt. 
 
                                                                                                                   
[hereinafter BROWN REP.]; FPD REP., supra note 1. 
4
 BROWN REP., supra note 3, at 4. 
5
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 2 (alleging that “Ferguson’s law enforcement practices 
are shaped by the City’s focus on revenue rather than by public safety needs”). The 
Justice Department report is not the first criticism of Ferguson’s law enforcement 
system. See, e.g., Tʜᴏᴍᴀs Hᴀʀᴠᴇʏ ET AL., ARCHCITY DEFENDERS: MUNICIPAL 
COURTS WHITE PAPER 2, 27, 31, 34 (2014), https://archive.org/details/pdfy-
iyuTY46j7R_fAvpK [hereinafter ARCHCITY WHITE PAPER] (reviewing the 
municipal court practices in the Missouri cities of Bel-Ridge, Florissant, and 
Ferguson); Class Action Complaint, Fant v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:15-cv-00253 
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2015), http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/wp-
content/uploads/2015/02/Complaint-Ferguson-Debtors-Prison-FILE-STAMPED.pdf. 
6
 See, e.g., Alex Bender et. al., Not Just a Ferguson Problem: How Traffic Courts 
Drive Inequality in California, LCCR.COM 6 (2015), http://www.lccr.com/wp-
content/uploads/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-
Inequality-in-California-4.8.15.pdf [hereinafter CAL. REP.] (describing traffic fine 
abuses in California); Ruth Marcus, Policing by Fleecing in Ferguson and Beyond, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 6, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/in-ferguson-
and-other-cities-jailed-for-being-poor/2015/03/06/e8cb5896-c42a-11e4-9271-
610273846239_story.html (asserting “[t]he most important thing to understand about 
the problems with the police force in Ferguson, Mo., is that they’re not unique to 
Ferguson”); Simon McCormack, The Ferguson Report was Damning, But It’s Not 
Just a Ferguson Problem, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 9, 2015, 4:19 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/03/09/ferguson-report_n_6833272.html 
(describing “glaring racial disparities in minor arrest statistics” in Boston, Detroit, 
Minneapolis, New York City, Newark, and Philadelphia); Editorial Board, Policing 
for Profit Perverts Justice: Our View, USA Tᴏᴅᴀʏ (Mar. 11, 2015, 7:01 PM), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/03/11/ferguson-mo-police-traffic-
tickets-justice-department-editorials-debates/70175690/ (describing allegations of 
policing for profit practices in Alabama, Mississippi, and Ohio). 
7
 Holder Press Release, supra note 2. 
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 This Article will address the collection issues by identifying 
the key findings in the Department of Justice’s report and discussing 
the major points to be learned from the allegations in Ferguson.  The 
lessons learned from Ferguson should be a guide to other 
municipalities that are or may be on the brink of developing similar 
abusive collection practices.
8
 
 
I. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT’S INVESTIGATION 
 The report on the Ferguson Police Department has been 
characterized as a “scathing” indictment of city officials, the court 
system, and the police in their relentless pursuit of revenue collection 
leading to violations of federal constitutional and statutory law.
9
  This 
section of the Article will briefly describe the background and 
methodology of the report as well as its primary findings. 
 
A.  Background & Methodology 
 
 The pattern-or-practice provisions of the Violent Crime 
                                                 
8
 In an introduction to a paperback version of the report, Theodore Shaw, Director of 
the Center for Civil Rights at the University of North Carolina School of Law, urges 
all Americans to read the report as a starting point to “begin the process of turning 
the tragedy of Ferguson into a turning point for our country.” Tʜᴇᴏᴅᴏʀᴇ M. Sʜᴀᴡ, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INTRODUCTION To THE FERGUSON 
REPORT xvi (2015). After months of negotiations, the  Department of Justice and the 
City of Ferguson were unable to reach an agreement to resolve the concerns in the 
Ferguson report, and the Department filed a complaint against Ferguson. Matt 
Apuzzo, Department of Justice Sues Ferguson, Which Reversed Course on 
Agreement, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs (Feb. 10, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/11/us/politics/justice-department-sues-ferguson-
over-police-deal.html; Complaint, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-
00180 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 10, 2016), https://s3.amazonaws.com/pacer-
documents/99/144595/10716541447.pdf. This article was submitted prior to the 
lawsuit and does not specifically address the allegations in the complaint; however, 
the allegations are similar to the findings and conclusions made in the Ferguson 
report. 
9
 Mark Berman & Wesley Lowrey, The 12 Key Highlights From the DOJ’s Scathing 
Ferguson Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 4, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/03/04/the-12-key-
highlights-from-the-dojs-scathing-ferguson-report/; Trymaine Lee, Justice 
Department Releases Scathing Ferguson Report, MSNBC.COM (Mar. 3, 2015, 9:17 
PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/justice-department-releases-scathing-ferguson-
report; FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1. 
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Control and Law Enforcement Act,
10
 the Omnibus Crime Control and 
Safe Streets Act,
11
 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
12
 authorized 
the report on the Ferguson Police Department.
13
  The investigation 
was not limited in scope or review to the operations or personnel of 
the police department; it also examined the role of city and court 
officials.
14
  A brief introduction to the city’s demographics and its 
governance policies is important to understanding the report. 
 
 Ferguson is one of nearly ninety cities located within St. Louis 
County, Missouri.
15
  The city consists of approximately 21,000 
citizens, of whom sixty-seven percent are African American and 
twenty-nine percent are Caucasian.
16
 One-quarter of Ferguson’s 
residents have incomes below the federal poverty level.
17
 
 
 An elected mayor and a six-person council govern the city.
18
  
A city manager appointed by the council serves as the chief executive 
and administrative officer and supervises the city’s departments, 
including the police department.
19
  The city manager also appoints the 
police chief.
20
 
 
 The municipal court is physically and operationally under the 
supervision of the police chief.
21
  The court is housed within the police 
department, and the court staff report to the police chief.
22
  Unlike the 
court staff, the municipal judge is not subject to the police chief’s 
supervision.  The judge, nominated by the city manager and elected by 
the council, is under state court rules generally subject to oversight by 
the St. Louis County Circuit Court; however, the municipal code gives 
the judge broad powers and discretion to establish the court’s practices 
                                                 
10
 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2006). 
11
 42 U.S.C. § 3789d (2006). 
12
 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2006). 
13
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1. 
14
 Id.  
15
 Id. at 6 (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau). 
16
 Id. (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau). 
17
 Id. (citing data from the U.S. Census Bureau).  
18
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 7. 
19
 Id. 
20
 Id.  
21
 Id. at 8. 
22
 Id. at 8. 
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and procedures.
23
 
 
 The Department of Justice’s report was based primarily on 
interviews, ride-alongs with officers, courtroom observations, reviews 
of third-party studies, police records, incident reports, emails, and 
information submitted by police and court officials.
24
  The 
investigators interviewed the top city, court, and police officials, 
including the mayor, the city manager, the finance director, the judge, 
the court clerk, and the police chief.  Additionally, they questioned 
half of the police officers as well as hundreds of city residents who 
had contact with the police.  The investigators also spoke with 
community and advocacy groups.
25
 
 
B. Findings & Conclusions 
 
 The six-month Ferguson investigation found three major 
problems: a misplaced focus on collection, racial bias, and a 
community’s distrust in the criminal justice system.26 
 
1. Revenue Maximization as the Primary Goal 
 
 The report concludes that Ferguson’s focus on revenue 
collection adversely affected its law enforcement process to the 
detriment of its citizens.
27
  The investigators found that the over-
emphasis on revenue collection was a policy that pervaded 
governmental, judicial, and policing powers as “[c]ity, police, and 
court officials for years [had] worked in concert to maximize revenue 
at every stage of the enforcement process.”28 
 
 City officials stressed the importance of revenue maximization 
in the municipality’s monitoring of collections, as well as its 
communications with police and court officials.  The city’s estimated 
and actual revenues collected reflect a significant and increasing 
reliance on fines and fees from enforcement of municipal code 
                                                 
23
 Id. (citing FERGUSON, MO., MUN. CODE § 13-29) 
24
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 1. 
25
 Id. 
26
 Id. at 2. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. at 10. 
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violations.
29
  Actual fines and fees collected between the fiscal years 
2010 and 2013 increased each year with $1.38 million collected in 
2010 and $2.46 million collected in 2013.  Budgeted amounts for 
fiscal years 2014 and 2015 were $2.63 million and $3.09 million, 
respectively.  The $1.38 million collected in 2010 represented about 
12.5% of the general revenues for 2010, while the $3.09 million 
budgeted in 2015 represents over 23% of the budgeted general 
revenues for 2015.
30
 
 
 To help reach the budgeted revenue increases, city officials 
regularly monitored revenue collection efforts by the courts and the 
police, approved high fines, and encouraged aggressive collection 
efforts.
31
  Law enforcement reports provided to the city focused on 
revenue generation, such as tickets issued, rather than public safety 
concerns.
32
 Moreover, the investigation found that city officials even 
directed enforcement plans to “fill the revenue pipeline,”33 and tried to 
maximize revenue within the state-imposed limit on revenues from 
fines.
34
  Communications to court and police officials praised efforts 
that continually increased collection amounts.
35
 
 
 The city’s focus on revenue collection, in turn, created pressure 
on officers to maximize revenue.  Officer productivity, promotion, 
evaluation, and discipline were based on the number of arrests and 
citations.
36
  Lists displayed in the police station reflected the monthly 
arrest statistics for each officer.  Officers were encouraged to write 
multiple citations at every stop, with bragging rights going to those 
who had the most citations during a single stop.
37
 
 
 Similarly, the report found that the city’s revenue 
maximization goals “fundamentally compromise[d] the role of  
                                                 
29
 Id. at 9. 
30
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 9–10. 
31
 Id. at 12–13. 
32
 Id. at 11. 
33
 Id. at 13 (quoting Ferguson’s Financial Director). 
34
 Id. at 14. 
35
 Id. at 13. 
36
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 11–12. 
37
 Id. at 11 (finding that “[i]ssuing three or four charges in one stop is not 
uncommon” and that “[o]fficers sometimes write six, eight, or in at least one 
instance, fourteen citations for a single encounter”). 
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Ferguson’s municipal court.”38  The city’s finance director, the police 
chief, and the court clerk had a role in setting the revenue goals for 
fines and fees.  Court staff and the judge recognized the city’s focus on 
obtaining these goals.
39
  Preset fines in Ferguson were typically “‘at or 
near the top of the list’ compared with other [Missouri] 
municipalities.”40  For non-preset fines, the report identified particular 
cases of high fines, including charges of over $300 for a manner of 
walking violation and over $500 for high grass and weeds.
41
 
 
The finance director praised the judge for increasing court 
collections and creating additional fees.
42
  When the city council was 
considering reappointment of the judge, and concerns were raised 
about whether he was handling cases “properly and fairly,” the city 
manager, commented “[i]t goes without saying the [c]ity cannot afford 
to lose any efficiency in our [c]ourts, nor experience any decrease in 
our [f]ines and [f]orfeitures.”43 
 
 As support for its claim that the court focused more on revenue 
production than public safety, the report highlighted the court’s use of 
arrest warrants and additional fees for failure to appear or make 
payments.
44
  This practice produced “overwhelming evidence of minor 
municipal code violations resulting in multiple arrests, jail time, and 
payments that exceed[ed] the cost of the original ticket many times 
over.”45  Accordingly, while penalties for underlying violations were 
typically limited to fines, defendants were often arrested and 
incarcerated based on failure to pay the fines.
46
 
                                                 
38
 Id. at 3. 
39
 Id. at 14. 
40
 Id. at 52. 
41
 Id.  
42
 Id. at 14. Notably, the additional fees included “many of which are widely 
considered abusive and may be unlawful, including several that the City has repealed 
during the pendency of [the Department of Justice’s] investigation.” Id. 
43
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 15. 
44
 Id. at 42. Notably, after the investigation started, Ferguson ended its practice of 
imposing Failure to Appear charges. Id.  
45
 Id. 
46
 Id. at 42. For a more detailed discussion of use of arrest and incarceration as a 
method of collecting criminal justice debt, see Neil L. Sobol, Charging the Poor: 
Criminal Justice Debt & Modern-Day Debtors’ Prisons, 75 MD. L. REV. 486 (2016),  
http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3701&context
=mlr. 
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 Overall, the report found that instead of “act[ing] as a neutral 
arbiter of the law . . . the court primarily use[d] its judicial authority as 
the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance[d] the 
[c]ity’s financial interests.”47 
 
2. Racial Bias 
 
 Ferguson’s focus on the collection of revenue reportedly 
“reflects and exacerbates existing racial bias, including racial 
stereotypes.”48  The investigation concluded that African Americans 
received disparate treatment at virtually every phase of the law 
enforcement process, and such treatment included intentional 
discrimination in violation of equal protection rights under the 
Constitution.
49
  While approximately two-thirds of Ferguson’s 
residents are African American, the following statistics reflect the 
disparate treatment by the police and the court system and portray a 
“comprehensive municipal justice system that, at each juncture, 
enforces the law more harshly against black people than others:”50 
 
● African Americans were subject to eighty-five percent of 
traffic stops, eighty-eight percent of the reported cases 
involving police use of force, ninety percent of citations, and 
ninety-three percent of arrests.
51
 
 
● African Americans were twice as likely to be cited and more 
than twice as likely to be arrested and searched following a 
traffic stop, even though contraband was twenty-six percent 
less likely to be found with African Americans.
52
 
                                                 
47
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 3. 
48
 Id. at 2. A detailed analysis of Ferguson’s racial bias and segregation issues is 
beyond the scope of this Article. For more information, see RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE MAKING OF FERGUSON: PUBLIC POLICIES AT THE 
ROOT OF ITS TROUBLES (2014), http://s3.epi.org/files/2014/making-of-ferguson-
final.pdf. Additionally, for a detailed discussion of the role that race plays in police 
stops, see CHARLES R. EPP, STEVEN MAYNARD-MOODY & DONALD HAIDER-
MARKEL, PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP (2014). 
49
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 62. 
50
 Id. at 63. 
51
 Id. at 62. 
52
 Id. 
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● African Americans were “more likely to receive multiple 
citations during a single incident.”53 
 
● African Americans received a disproportionate amount of 
charges for petty offenses, including over ninety-percent of 
charges for manner of walking in a roadway, failure to comply, 
resisting arrest, and disturbing the peace.
54
 
 
● African Americans were sixty-eight percent less likely to have 
their cases dismissed, received ninety-two percent of the arrest 
warrants issued, and represented ninety-six percent of those 
arrested solely because of an outstanding municipal warrant.
55
 
 
 The report determined that “this disproportionate burden on 
African Americans cannot be explained by any difference in the rate at 
which people of different races violate the law.”56  Instead, the 
Department of Justice concluded that the disparate treatment was due 
in part to unlawful bias and racial stereotypes and found “substantial 
evidence of racial bias among police and court staff.”57  The evidence 
included the racial disparities in police and court actions, the historical 
opposition to African Americans in Ferguson, and racial stereotypes 
reflected in communications by police and court personnel.
58
 
 
 Additionally, the composition of the police force and the court 
personnel do not reflect the diversity in Ferguson.  The report found 
that only four of Ferguson’s fifty-four sworn police officers were 
African American.
59
  Similarly, at the time of the report, the judge, the 
prosecuting attorney, and the clerks in the municipal court were 
                                                 
53
 Id. 
54
 Id. at 62. A manner of walking violation can occur if an individual “walk[s] along 
and upon an adjacent roadway” rather than the sidewalk. FERGUSON, MO., MUN. 
CODE § 44-344 (2015). 
55
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 62–63. 
56
 Id. at 5. 
57
 Id. 
58
 Id. at 63. The report identified specific messages sent by court and police 
personnel, including supervisors, using their city email accounts that reflected racial 
bias. Id. at 72. Typically, the messages were forwarded and senders were not 
disciplined. Id. 
59
 Id. at 7. 
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white.
60
 
 
3. Distrust 
 
 Ferguson’s persistent focus on revenue collection and the 
disparate treatment of African Americans created distrust in the police 
and judicial system, which existed “long before Michael Brown’s 
shooting death in August 2014.”61  Instead, the report found that the 
distrust was primarily due to the “years of unlawful and unfair law 
enforcement practices by” the police and court system.62  The report 
referred to research confirming the findings in Ferguson that “when 
police and courts treat people unfairly, unlawfully, or disrespectfully, 
law enforcement loses legitimacy in the eyes of those who have 
experienced, or even observed, the unjust conduct.”63  The lack of 
trust, in turn, makes it unlikely that citizens will “seek police 
assistance even when they are victims of crime, or that they will 
cooperate with the police to solve or prevent other crimes.”64 
 
 Ferguson’s failure to have a system for effectively reporting 
and dealing with citizens’ complaints about the police contributed to 
the lack of trust issue.
65
  The report found that the department’s 
“tolerance for officer misconduct” when viewed in relation to the 
“aggressive enforcement of even minor municipal infractions” 
supported the statement “that a ‘different set of rules’ applies to 
Ferguson’s police than to its African-American residents, and that 
making a complaint about officer misconduct is futile.”66 
 
 Moreover, the failure to develop community policing or 
                                                 
60
 Id. at 8. Additionally, at the time of the shooting of Michael Brown, only one of 
the six council members were African American, and the police chief and mayor 
where white. Matt Pearce, Maya Srikrishnan & David Zucchino, Protesters and 
Police Face Off in St. Louis Suburb Over Shooting, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2014, 
10:19 PM), http://www.latimes.com/nation/nationnow/la-na-missouri-st-louis-
police-shooting-teen-20140811-story.html#page=1. 
61
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 79. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. at 80 (citing TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: 
ENCOURAGING PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND COURTS (2002)). 
64
 Id. at 81. 
65
 Id. at 82–86. 
66
 FPD REP., supra note 1, at 82. 
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engagement strategies only exacerbated the preexisting trust issues.
67
  
As revenue-maximization practices increased, community-policing 
efforts decreased and “dwindled to almost nothing in recent years.”68  
Ferguson has only one officer assigned to community relations.  
Moreover, the department’s focus on the importance of ticket writing 
and use of twelve-hour shifts to generate increased revenue has 
reportedly adversely affected community relations.
69
 
 
 
II. MOVING FORWARD 
 
Revenue maximization, racial bias, and community distrust 
have created a system in Ferguson that improperly disregards the 
rights of individuals.  The Department of Justice’s report recognizing 
that resolving the issues in Ferguson will require “a fundamental 
redirection of Ferguson’s approach to law enforcement” suggests 
reforms in both the police department and the court system.
70
  Change 
has begun, as following the release of the report, the mayor, city 
manager, police chief, municipal judge, court clerk, and other court 
personnel have either resigned or been dismissed.
71
  This section will 
build on the broad recommendations in the report and evaluate some 
of the steps that have already been taken. 
 
A. Focus on Protecting and Serving Rather than Collecting 
Revenue 
  
 Instead of viewing the police and the court system as primarily 
a funding source, municipalities must recognize the importance of 
                                                 
67
 Id. at 86–88. 
68
 Id. at 87. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 90. 
71
 Christine Byers & Stephen Deere, A Look Into Ferguson's Pricey Pick To 
Negotiate DOJ Settlement, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 3, 2015, 5:05 AM), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/a-look-into-ferguson-s-pricey-
pick-to-negotiate-doj/article_05a6800b-e525-5392-94eb-cbf7b68a1830.html 
(describing the release of employees based on racist emails and the resignations of 
the city manager, police chief, and municipal judge); Wesley Lowery & Sari 
Horwitz, Ferguson Police Chief Tom Jackson Resigns Following Scathing DOJ 
Report, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/03/11/ferguson-police-tom-jackson-resigns-following-scathing-doj-
report/. 
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providing justice and protection for its citizens.  The system should re-
examine the setting and assessment of fees and fines, remove revenue 
collection as the primary means for evaluating police officers and 
court personnel, take into account ability to pay criminal justice debt, 
and use payment alternatives when appropriate.
72
 
 
 Notably, on July 9, 2015, Missouri’s Governor Jay Nixon 
signed a reform bill, aimed at ending many of the practices criticized 
in the report on Ferguson.
73
  The bill, touted by Nixon as “’the most 
sweeping’ municipal court reform bill in state history,” addresses 
uncontrolled revenue generation, excessive monetary charges, and the 
use of incarceration for minor traffic violations.
74
 
 
 Specifically, the legislation establishes caps for the percentage 
of a municipality’s annual operating revenue attributed to fines and 
charges for minor traffic violations.  In 2016, the cap will be 12.5% for 
municipalities in counties with more than 950,000 residents and 20% 
for municipalities in counties with populations less than 950,000.
75
  
Furthermore, fines and court costs for any minor traffic violation are 
limited to $300, and costs shall not be assessed if a defendant is 
determined to be indigent.
76
  The reform permits incarceration for 
minor traffic violations only if they involve “alcohol or controlled 
substances . . . endangering health or welfare of others, [or] eluding or 
giving false information to a law enforcement officer.”77  Additionally, 
municipalities must establish procedures for determining indigency of 
defendants and use the information in setting fines, costs, and 
payments options.
78
  Cities must certify that they do not assess failure 
to appear charges for minor traffic violations, and that they use 
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 MO. ANN. STAT. § 479.359.2 (West 2015). 
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rules to help courts establish standards for determining indigency. Id. 
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 Id. § 479.353(2). 
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“alternative payment plans and community service alternatives.”79 
 
  For enforcement purposes, the statute establishes minimum 
standards that require annual audits, adequate insurance, publication of 
ordinances, certification or accreditation of police departments, and 
written policies regarding use of force and reporting of crime and 
police stop data.
80
  Additionally, it sets up a procedure for residents to 
allege that municipalities have failed to meet the standards and 
establishes remedies for failure to meet the standards.
81
  Municipalities 
that fail to comply with the requirements risk transfer of court cases, 
“loss of sales tax revenue[,] and disincorporation.”82 
 
 The reform is a good start; however, it is limited to cases 
involving minor traffic violations.  Merely placing caps on minor 
traffic violations may not resolve the revenue maximization or racial 
bias issues as it leaves open the potential for cities to create revenue by 
increasing collection of fines for non-traffic violations.
83
  Non-traffic 
citations, such as loitering, sagging pants, high grass, peeling paint, 
and jaywalking,
84
 accounted for more than fifty-percent of the 
citations in Ferguson.
85
  African Americans received ninety-five 
percent of the “manner of walking” in a roadway citations issued in 
Ferguson.
86
  As one commentator calculated, African Americans were 
over nine times more likely to be cited for “manner of walking.”87  A 
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manner of walking charge was Officer Darren Wilson’s initial 
allegation against Michael Brown and was the charge used against 
protesters following the fatal shooting of Brown.
88
 
 
 Fees and fines should be rationally related to the offense 
charged and should not be used merely to raise revenue.
89
  To reduce 
conflict of interest concerns, Professors Wayne Logan and Ronald 
Wright suggest the adoption of independent commissions to examine 
the appropriateness of current and proposed monetary sanctions.
90
  A 
recent draft of the Model Penal Code (Second) of Sentencing abolishes 
all costs and fees on the basis that their collection creates conflicts of 
interest and does not fulfill the goals of sentencing.
91
  Moreover, the 
Model Penal Code draft broadens ability to pay determinations by 
precluding any monetary sanctions that would leave defendants 
without “sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family 
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obligations.”92 
 
B. Remove Racial Bias 
 
 Hopefully, removing the focus on revenue-based policing will 
eliminate some of the racial bias complaints; however, as the report 
revealed, racial bias was due to other more insidious issues in the city, 
including intentional discrimination.  Training, supervision, 
accountability, and diversity are essential to addressing racial biases.  
Training needs to reflect the racial concerns, conduct standards should 
be established, and police and court officials should be held 
accountable and subject to discipline for failure to meet the 
standards.
93
  Data should be continually collected and evaluated to 
help track the efforts at reducing racial disparities.
94
  Incentives should 
be created to encourage such reductions.
95
  Additionally, diversity 
must be a focus in recruiting, hiring, and promotion to help establish a 
municipal system that is more reflective of the community.
96
 
 
C. Restore Trust 
 
 Resolving the problems of reliance on revenue generation and 
racial bias are important, but ultimately, the distrust created by the 
system must also be addressed.  The Department of Justice has 
emphasized that “if the Ferguson Police Department truly commits to 
community policing, it can restore the trust that it has lost.”97  
Improved community engagement is necessary so that “law 
enforcement is seen as part of, rather than distant from, the 
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communities they serve.”98 
 
 Better community engagement requires not only that law 
enforcement is positively involved in the community but also that the 
community participates in the law enforcement process.
99
  Instead of 
reducing community involvement and leaving only one officer 
engaged in community relations, positive community engagement 
should be a priority.  Officers must take an active role in helping and 
participating in the community.  Officers should be evaluated on 
positive community involvement, rather than on the number of tickets 
that they write.
100
  Additionally, the community must have an 
opportunity to review the law enforcement process.  Citizen oversight 
groups should be established.  Procedures for dealing with complaints 
about law enforcement need to be set up, and transparency be afforded 
to the public.
101
  The shooting of Michael Brown has prompted 
widespread calls for the use of body cameras by police, and Jim 
Bueermann, president of the Police Foundation in Washington, 
predicts that “[w]ithin the next five years or so, body-worn cameras 
will be as ubiquitous in the world of policing as handcuffs, the police 
radio, and gun.”102  A more controversial remedy to help restore 
community relations is the use of police residency requirements.
103
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 Removing racial bias and changing the focus of law 
enforcement to protecting and serving rather than collecting revenue 
should help with the community’s acceptance of law enforcement.  As 
Professor Tom R. Tyler, who has written extensively on creating 
community trust in the legal system, has stated: 
 
[S]tudies consistently show that the most important issue to 
public evaluations of the police is whether they believe that 
the police are exercising their authority fairly.  This means 
that they are not making decisions about who to stop based 
upon race; that they are willing to listen to people when 
they stop them; apply the law consistently and without 
prejudice and take time to explain the reasons for their 
actions.  Most importantly, the police need to treat people 
in the community respectfully and with courtesy.  When the 
police do these things they build trust.  In other words, we 
know how the police can build trust in communities, White 
or minority.  If people see the police acting with justice, 
they respond with trust.
104
 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
 The allegations in Ferguson are shocking and distressing, 
especially given the comments that they are not limited to this one 
city.  Efforts must now focus on resolving the issues in Ferguson and 
elsewhere, rather than merely continued criticism.  Municipalities owe 
an obligation to protect and serve their residents rather than treat them 
as sources of revenue. 
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